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ABSTRACT
The paper provides a theoretical framework for analysing
policyformation among independent authorities operating in an
interdependent environment. This is then applied to the analysis
of optimal monetary policy in a stochastic two—country model with
rationalexpectations. The main conclusions are 1) OptImal
monetary policy requires a finite response of the money supply to
the exchange rate (which is the only contemporaneously observed
variable.) Neither a fixednora freely floating exchange rate is
likelyto be optImal. 2) Output stabilizing monetary policy may
well require 'leaning with the wind' in the foreign exchange
market, expanding the money supply when the home currency depreciates,
thus increasing the volatility of the exchange rate. 3) The ability
of the monetary authorities to influence real variables is due to
the assumption that the private sector does not make exchange rate—
contingent forward contracts.4) There are likely to be gains from
policy co—ordination.
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The demise of Eretton Woods ahd of the short-livedSmithsonian
agreement has raised questions about exchange rate management bymonetary
authoritiesacting in isolation from one another. For instance, will individual
monetary authorities have an incentive to stabilise the exchange rate?To what
extent will monetary actions abroad disrupt domesticmonetary policy?What are
the gains from co—ordinating monetary policy?
The problems that arise when different agents pursue independentpolicies
in interdependent economies have been explored by a number ofauthors.Aoki
(1976), Cooper (1969), Hamada (1976), Allen and icenen (1980), McFadden (1967),
Patrick (1973) ,Kydland(1976) and Pindyck (1976), among others, have made
significant contributions. Different authors have focused on different aspects
of decentralized policy formation. One purpose of this paper is to provide a
general discussion of decentralization. In part 2 we provide a
theoretical framework for analysing policy formationamong independent authorities
operating in an interdependent environment. We distinguish three dimensions of
the problem and discuss, by way of example, the Mundell (1962)assignment problem
in terms of our typology.We show that instability in Mundell's context does
not arise because different authorities are assigned different andinappropriate
targets, but because they fail to formulate strategies in a co—operativeway.
A second purpose of this paperis to analyse the optimal design of monetary
policyin interdependent economies.Previous analytic discussion of policy
decentralization has been based on deterministic models.Furthermore, with the
exception of Hamada(1976),who considers the problem in a classical, full—
employmentcontext, these models incorporate the traditional neo—Keynesian
assumptionof fixed prices. Studies incorporating stochastic elements have also
used a neQ—Keynesian framework and rely solely on simulation analysis(Pindyck
(1976) and Kydland (1976)). None of the studies incorporates recent contributions
to the theory of aggregate supply and expectations formation associated with the—2—
"New Classical Macroeconomics".
We considertwo monetary authori ties pursuing domestic targets in two
economies connected both by trade in real goods and in national monies.
The model is presented in section 3. Each economy is characterised by
a supply function of the Lucas type in which deviations of output from
its natural level occur only because of deviations of the domestic price
level from the value that was anticipated in the previous period.The
natural level is itself stochastic.Agents in each economy hold domestic
money for transactions purposes but may speculate on exchange rate movements
by holding domestic or foreign money.We assume that money demands are also
stochastic. The two economies are linked by a stochastic purchasing power
parity relationship between the two price levels and the exchange rate.
Throughout, we assume that the only contemporaneous variable observed
by the two monetary authorities and the private sectors is the exchange rate.
Incomes and price levels are observed only with a one—period lag.Each
monetary authority's problem, then, is to infer from the observed current
exchange rate the type of shocks affecting the economy and to set the current
money supply to offset these shocks, taking into account the response of the
foreign monetary authority to its actions.
Insection 4we assume that each country's monetary authority pursu& the
objectiveof stabilizing output around the average Or 'OXante",naturallevel
ofoutput.In section 5 we modify the objective to one of stabilizing income
aroundthe actual but unobserved natural rate. This second objective is
equivalent to niinimising price forecast errors and is more likely to lead to
a policy of exchange rate stabilization.In section 6, we introduce exchange
rate stabilization as an additional, independent goal.—3—
Throughout, we derive the policy rules which obtain when the monetary
authorities pursue distinct targets independently. In sections 4 and S the
optimal policy rules are not affected if, instead, authorities pursue a
common objective cooperatively. This result does not extend to more general
models such as the one considered in section 6.
A main purpose of the model we develop in sections 3 through 6 is to
provide insight into the design of optimal policies for dirty floating.
Models in which current policy can only respond to past information must
implicitly assume that either the exchange rate or the money supply is fixed
withinthe period: exchange rates are either fixed ox the float is clean
within the period [see Buiter l979a3.Ourmodel,however, allows for a
contemporaneous money supply response to the current exchange rate
Setting the money supply to fix the exchange rate or ignoring the exchange
ratein setting the money supply constitute special cases of our model.
Indeed,we find that optimal monetary policy can involveexacerbating
exchangerate movements.-"
2. Alternative Definitions of Folicy Decentralization and Coordination
Thequestion of policy decentralization arises in interdependent systems
in which distinct agents, whom we call authorities, have the ability to
setinstruments in the pursuit of possibly independent objectives. For
simplicity, consider a system with two authorities. At time t the first
authorityseeks to maximize an objective function of the form—4—
(2.1) w nE[E(dl)T tVl( ,2, x)I1J 0 <1
where y represents a vector of state variables in period T and x' a set
of levels of the instrument variables under the control of authority 1.
isthe 1th authority's set of information about the state of the economy
in period t.
A second authority may be maximizing an objective function of the form
(2.2) w E[(2)t_tv2(y)(l ?) o < <
Letus assume that the state variables y evolve according to




If the authorities adopt time—consistent policies• we can define their
optimizing behaviour recursively as in (2.4) and (2.5)
(2.4)Wiwax E [V1(y, x, x) + W11JI2')
xtEXt
and
2 2 1 222 2 (2.5) W Emax
E [Vt(Y; xtf xt) +
XtEXt
Here and represent the sets of feasible values of x and x respectively.
If agents are pursuing mernoryless Nash strategies (see Kydland (1976)) then
is set taking agent l's future behaviour and agent 2's current and
future behaviour as given and similarly for agent 2.We thus define—5—
'1 11 1 2 '2 22 2
' T'' "'t—l' and x = ..-'
•'&, ...) r>t+l as the values of x and x which attainand
respectively.withinthis frameworkwe identifythree types of
decentralization and coordination.
(1)Target decentralizationoccurs when the two authorities have different
objective functionals, i.e. when w1w2.Full coordination of targets
requiresthat the authorities adopt a common objective functional w. This
doesnot necessarily imply that authorities maximize w with respect to the same
information,i.e. may not equal Q. Furthermore, even though authorities
have a coirunon set of objectives, they need not play a cooperative game in the
formal sense; i.e. no binding pre—play agreementson the choice of and
may have been established.
(2) Decentralization of nonstrategicinformation occurs when authorities
have access to different information sets concerning the state of the economy
y 2) .Fullcoordination of such information requires that the authorities
share this information.Each authority will then form expectations and policy
in periodt onthe basis of LiQ.This type of coordination need not imply
that authorities adopt common objectives or that they formulateand
cooperatively.
(3)Finally,decentralization of strategicinformation arises whenever
and are chosen independently.This type of decentralization could even
arise in situations where authorities shared objectives (w1 =w2)and
information aboutthestate of the economy (c= Q)but the optimal
cooperativestrategy is non—unique.It is analogous to the decentralization
problem faced by an American foothfll team which has snapped the ball without
having called a play in the huddle.Coordination of stragegic information
means that authorities makebinding,"pre—play" agreements on their choice
ofand ,which,they ma' do even thouqh their tarqets and information
about the state of the economy maydiffer.
Mundell's (1962) assignment problemseems to represent this last type of





< 2 > 0
(2.7) B =1r+S2G S1 > 2 < 0
where Y denotes income, r the interest rate, G government spending and fl the
balanceof payments.The objective of policy is to stabilize Y and B; that
is,to assure asymptotic convergents of I and B to target levels which we set
without loss of generality at I =B=0.Policy is restricted to finite
instantaneous rates of change of C and r which are linear functions of authorities'
information sets.
Mundell constrains his analysis to policies which assign one instrument,
r,to one authority and C to another.The monetary authority responds only
to B according to the rule.
(2.8)r =
whilethe fiscal authority responds to Y according to
(2.9) Cyl
Mundell then shows that if the authorities choose 6 C0and y <0—thenatural
"leaning against the wind" rules —thenifIa1/a2I$1/52I'i.e. instruments
arewt assigned according to "comparative advantage", the system represented
by(2.6) —(2.9)is unstable.
Printi facie, this problem might be interpreted as one of either
decentralized non—strategicinformation(each authority knows onlyone of the
twostate variables, I and r, as well asthe values of the structural parameters
a. and 5.,i=l, 2 or at least the relative strengths of the effects of the
instrumentson the targets) or one of decentralization of strategic
information(each authority chooses its response function independently).





For any values of the structural parameters there exist values of 6andy
(notnecessarily the leaning against the wind values), which satisfy (2.10)
and (2.ll).' Therefore, authorities can attain their objective without
sharing information about Y and r. They need only cooperate by jointly
choosing appropriate values of 6 and y.
Without such cooperation, sharing information on Y and r will rtt
guarantee stability.Under full nonstrategic information sharing, the two















(2.15) (1261 —6211)"l2 —a2S1)
>0
Withoutknowing the parameters of the fiscal authority's response function,
and2' there are no values of and62 which themonetary authority could
select to ensure stability. 1n equivalent problem faces the fiscal authorities.
Even though both authorities have full information about thestate of the
economy,they cannot be sure of attaining their objective ifoneauthority does
notknow what the other is doing.Thus the assignment problem arises not
because authorities have been arbitrarily assigned target variables but
becausethey do not determine jointly how theywill respond to these variables.—8—
3. A Two—Country Model of Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Determination
We now turn to a model in which tcwget and strategicinfornrztion
decentralization both arise.Two national monetary authorities pursue separate
objectives but have access to the same information about thestate of the world.
Each authority sets its money supply in response to the current exchangerate
between the twomonies,taking the other authority's response as given.
We derive optimal money supply rules in a model of considerable simplicity.
Firstly, we consider two economies in which the deviation ofactual output from
itslong—run normal level is proportional to the percentagedeviation of the
actual price level from the price level anticipated in the previous period.





Here denotes the deviation of home—country output from the full employment
level and Pt the logarithm of the home—country price level; titldenotes
the expectation of Pt basedon information available in period t—l and u
denotesa aussian white noise disturbance tern withvariance a yu
Equivalent magnitudes in the foreign countryare denoted with an asterisk.
n *n
Theactual or ex—post natural levels of outputs, y and ,obtainwhen
* * n y *n *y
Pt =tIt—l
and Pt =tIt—l
respectively, that is =u
and =u
Exante, the expected natural levels are simply zero.
Justification for output supply equations of the form (3.1)and (3.2)
is provided by Lucas (1972) and Sargent and Wallace (1975). output equations
of the form (3.1) and (3.2) would arise also if wagecontracts are formed one
period in advance.Wages in period t, it is assumed, cannot bemodified by
information that is not available before periodt7" Other motivations of—9—
(3.1) and (3.2) involve imperfect observation of the contemporaneous
aggregate price' level.
Secondly, we assume that citiiens in each, country must hold domestic
money for transactions purposes but may speculate by holding foreign money.









*** ** *m ** (3.4)rn —Pt
=a + 5(et+1j_e)
+u a ,5 > 0.
Herem denotes the logarithm of nominal home—country money balances in
periodt, e the logarithm of the spot price of foreign currencyand
thevalue of eflexpected to occur in periodt.The terms u and
2 2 represent Gaussian white noise disturbances with variances cm and
respectively.The parameter a.denotes the income elasticity of demandfor
realmoney balances and Sthe'expected exchange rate appreciation elasticity.
When
et+ljt
is high relative toe foreign money balances are more attractive.
Finally, we assume that the domestic and foreign price levels are
connected by a stochastic purchasing power parity relationship, i.e.,
* e (3.5) Ptet+Pt+u
e 2 whereu represents a Gaussian white noise disturbance with variance C.:.
Also, for simplicity let contemporaneous values of u, uj, u, utm an: u be
unccrrelated.
We assume that e is the only endogenous or exoge nus variable observed
contemporaneously.All past endogenous and exogenous variables are also
partof the conunonprivate and public information set.The information set
at time t when m is chosen, denoted byistherefore given by; 21- 10-
(3.6) =
[er.
2t—I' ?i' Yt_iP _ij t < t.
or equivalently by
E
*y in xne1 =e,u,u ,u ,u ,,u J T<t r r—1 t—3.t—1t—lT—l
Inaddition both the authorities and the private sector know the true
structure of the model, including the first and second moments of the
distributions of the random disturbances.Expectations of Pt formed in
period t—i are conditional on and expectations of e+i formedinperindt
are conditional on The foreign country has the same information set as
the home country.
In period t the monetary authorities in the home country choose mt to
minimise





Theforeign monetary, authorities choose m to minimise
* * r, •.2 *





yand yare target real output at home and abroad, to be
* specifiedmore precisely below. S and are discount factors. Both
* * andm are chosen under the assumption that m •and mT minimise respectively
*
E(V I)and E(V & ) for all r>t. T t T t—11—
Bypermitting money supplies to respond to the contemporaneous exchange
rate but precluding the possibility of exchange—rate contingent money wage
contracts, known monetary rules will affect real output. In this model
policy makers set money supplies via transfers and taxes.Direct exchange
market intervention provides another mode which is consistent with our
specification if the other country sterilises the effect of exchange market
intervention on its own money supply via transfers and taxes.
Equations (3.1) through (3.5) can be solved by substituting (3.1).
(3.2) and (3.5) into (3.3) and (3.4) to obtain:
ri rmt












(3.8d) r I +
(3.8e) v —(ctu +u)
* **y *m
(3.Bf)vE —(ct u +u)
* * *
(3.Sg) AE7111 + 31T+ Br
*e
Therefore,sinceet = — u
(3.9) e =
Equations(3.8) and (3.9) represent reduced form expressions for the
price levels and the exchange rate given past expectations ci the current
price levels and current expectations of the future exchange rate. We now
consider the design of monetary policy.— 12—
4.Optimal Monetary Policy: The Nash Solution
Wefirst consider the optimal design of monetary policy when each monetary
authority follows a meinoryless Nash strateyy; that is, each monetary authority
sets its money supply as a function only of the contemporaneous value of the
state variables, taking as given the other monetary authority's money supply
rule.
In this section, target output is the ex antenaturallevel of output.
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Notethat for any variable q one has E E(t—i and
that E(E(qIQ)IS1 )=
E(qj.S) ),i,j >0.Wethus obtain, from t—i—j t—i—j
(3.8a),
+ Se r1—jr11 +WPtIti t+iit—t1c' (4.3) * =* * * * * I
LtI t—iJ[ft]t—i.
+' P — S
e411t—iJ
Subtracting(4.1) for i1from (3.9) yields:
el
[4[t_r-








* e (4.5)e=Pt— Pt —u
e —e
which,since u u t+iIt
—
t+ijt—i
=0,implies, for i > 0,
* * (4.6)e+I -e+±I1
=t+iIt2t+ijt—i —t+iIt
—t+iIt_i
we may write (4.4) as
(4.7) Pt —Ptit -
** I 3fl1* * -
tt—iJ It+lIt -t+ijt-i]

























































We define the following
y*y m *flje E(UrU 1 Ut, Uu)
Fu — E(uISlt)
e —E(ejQt1)
We may thus define
F (ë,ut1)
asthe new information available in period t. Since Ut.. 2 is known
at period t-1, and thus can depend only on and u unless monetary
policy is itself random.Revisions of expectations in period t about monetary
policy can only depend on information newly available in period t,
Restricting ourselves to linear time—invariant nonstochastic policies, we
may write
(4.11) —m.I1yut + j> o.
and




Since is known at time t, Y. and are purely determined by policy. Since
is only observed imperfectly in period t via y. and y, depend both on the policy
rules and the structure of the model.
Substituting (4.11) and (4.12) into (4.10)we obtain














Substituting(4.13) into (4.1) and (4.2) it is clear, sinceu and
and therefore u and u1, are orthogonal, that policies for which y. and y. are
non—zero increase the minimum expected loss.Such policies introduce additional
randomness, in the form of the unobserved (as of last period) component of last
period's disturbance into the current period price forecast error. We thus
restrict ourselves to monetary policies which do not respond to
If, in fact, y. 0, then policy responds only to currently observsi
components of the current disturbances. Since these can only be observed viae.





















Observe that any given values of 'P and V canbeachieved via linear
combinatiorofan infinite number of variations of the underlying policy parameters
a. and a,.For example a policy rule which sets a. =0,j+O,anda0a0
will have the same effect on the objective functional as one which sets a.0,
i +1and a1=
(BDCAB)'3a0.In general, the government can achieve the same
objective by responding only currently to current information (e) that it can
achieve by responding to this information at later dates.It is interesting to
note that even if the government were to have inferior information to the private
sector in the sense that they learn e at a later date, they can achieve their
objectives equally well.Turnovsky (1980) provides another example of this
phenomenon.(See also Buiter, 1980c).For convenience,we restrict ourselves
tocurrent response only.We thus assume a. =
a;
=0j +0.This restriction
uniquely has the virtue of yielding time consistent policies.A monetarypolicy
which responds in period tto e1, I Ct, does not affectby this response, but only
Sincey is at period t a bygone, time—consistent monetary authorities will




Sincern and m respond only to all endogenous variables in our model
depend, given expectations, only on current disturbances.Taylor (1977) has
shown that while models such as ours, whichincorporate current or past expectations
offtsLurendogenousvariables, have an infinite number of solutions in which
current endogenous variables depend on lagged exogenous variables, in the minimum
variance solution such lagged variables do not enter. We restrict our analysis
to this minimum variance solution.
Thus e, '' ' Pt and Pt depend linearly




Sincey and do not depend on mandm fort +T, theauthorities' problem
reduces to one of choosing a to minimize E(yIet) for the home country and a to
*2
minimize E(Y Jet) for the foreign country in each period t.
ach country will optimally choose its monetary policy rule, taking as
given the rule of the other country. Considering the home country first,
minimisation of E(y2Ie) is equivalent to choosing a money supply rule such
that E(yI e) =O—1"giventhe rule followed by the foreign authority.
—1 1* * ** *
(4.20)E(yJ e) = (r S )ae ÷ae +(Jr÷$)E(vtIe)
+E(v*I e) +¶*E(ue)]+ E(uIe)
=0
Theforeign country chooses its money supply rule such that E(yIe)=0,










(4.2o)and(4.2D can be rewritten as reaction functions as in (4.22)
and (4.23j.
(4.22)ae =- ae+.-E(ve) + E(vet)++*E et)
+* *utlet
TT+$




Note from (4.22) and(4.23)that the domestic money supply responds
negatively to the money supply airoad. Anincrease in the foreign money
supplycauses an appreciation of the exchangerate, creating expectations of
depreciation which reduce the demand for domestic currency.Topreventthe
reduction in demand for domestic currency from raising the domestic price level, an
accommodating reduction in domestic money supply must occur.Note also that
giventhe money supply in the foteign country:the optimal domestic
moneysupply in general responds to expectations of all types of shocks, both
domestic and foreign and both monetary and real. Using (3.Be), (3.Bf) and (4.5)
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2 2 EE(u);
a2 E((u) ); a E((u
uy U
Assuming the system given by(4.) and (4.23) to be of full rank, the
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*2 .-* *l* 2 mrmra + alray+4)cilia
U u*y—21—
is the (absolute value of the) elasticity of demand fordomestic
money with respect to the expected proportional rate of depreciation of the
*
domestic currency and —Sthecorresponding elastLcity for the foreign
currency. In a currency substitution framework they can be viewed as the
exchange rate speculation elasticities of home and foreign currency respect-
ively. The first terms of (4.27) or (4.271) and (4.28) or (4.28') therefore
suggest that monetary policy accommodates changes in the demand for
money due to unanticipated changes in the exchange rate, thereby neutralising
the effect of unanticipated exchange rate changes on the price level. This
policy insulates the economy from real effects of unanticipated exchange rate
changes.Remember that sinceet!tl =0,a monetary rule contingent on e
is a monetary rule contingent on the deviation of the actual exchange rate
in period t from the exchange rate for period t anticipated in period t—1.
As all disturbances are ii.d and there are no other sources of inertia in the
model (specificallymtjt l 0), rational expectations areregressive.L"
To the extent that monetary policy does accommodate swings in speculative
demand, monetary authorities "lean with the wind", in the foreign exchange
market, i.e. expand the money supply when the price of domestic currency is
*
lower than had been expected and conversely, i.e. a > 0 and a < 0. Such a
policy will exacerbate movements in the exchange rate, as can be seen from
equation (4.29), the reduced form expression for the exchange rate.
* **e * (4.29)e =(inv — — TIIu) (A —71a + Ira
The denominator of the second term on the right—hand side of (4.27') and
(4.28') is positive. Thus an increase in the variability of the demand for
money(02) will reduce the degree to which the authorities leanwith
the wind and may even reverse this policy.An expected increase in the demand
for domestic money will be associated with an unanticipated appreciation of
the home currency. Rather than contracting the money supply as would be optimal
if the main sources of uncertainty were foreign, optimal monetary policy will at
least in part accommodate the unexpected increase in the demand formoney by— 22—
expandingthe money supply.
The variability of foreign money demand has no effect on optimal domestic
monetary policy, however. This result may seem surprising since, from (4.7)
and (4.), foreign monetary shocks do affect domestic income and, from (4.9) and
(4.10), domestic monetary policy, given foreign monetary policy, does respond
to perceived shocks in the demand for foreign money. If foreign monetary
authorities pursue an optimal monetary policy, however, they minimize the effect
of their own monetary disturbances. Domestic monetary policy can then ignore
such disturbances.
An increase in the variance of domestic income shocks raises the optimal
degree to which monetary authorities should lean with the wind.A positive income
shock raises the demand for money and appreciates the exchange rate. To offset
the effect of a positive income shock authorities should contract the money supply.
Hence when exchange rate variation is caused in large part by instability in the
supply of domestic output, monetary authorities should act to augment exchange rate
changes.
The variability of foreign output shocks, unlike the variability of foreign
monetary shocks, does affect the optimal intervention policy. A positive foreign
output shock will tend to depreciate the exchange rate and engender a foreign
monetary action which further depreciates the exchange rate. (In contrast, a
foreign monetary disturbance engenders an offsetting foreign monetary action)
Foreign output shocks thus create exchange rate variability which is unrelated to
domestic disturbances.Any response designed to offset the effects of domestic
shocks, as perceived through exchange rate variation, on domestic targets will be
diminished.As arises, optimal domestic policy is aimed increasingly at
y
offsetting speculative behaviour.— 23—
Forthe same reason increased variability in shocks to the purchasing power
parity relationship also reduce the extent to which monetary policy can offset
2
the effects of domestic shocks on income.As a
erises, then policy should
U
increasingly isolate the domestic price level from the effects of exchange rate
speculation.
It is interesting to consider monetary policy in four special cases of the
model.
(a) No domestic shocks
When a2 =a2=0,there are no domestic sources of disturbances in
y m U U
the home country. The only shocks it faces are exchange rate disturbances
resulting either from the stochastic nature of the purchasing power parity
2 2
relationship (ae> 0) or from uncertainty in the rest of the world (*m'
> 0) In this case (4.27') reduces to a =$.Ifthere were noUsources
of disturbances internal to the foreign country (a2*y = = 0)(4.28) re-
duces to a* =— . Themoney supply rule is entirely accommodating. When
the exchange rate depreciates unexpectedly, the money supply expands. in the
absence of changes in the money supply a depreciation of the exchange rate
creates expectations of appreciation (since e+i, =0).These expectations increase
the speculative demand for home country money which would lower the homecountry
price level and therefore income. To offset this, the monetary authority
acts so as to accommodate exactly the higher money demand with a higher supply.
Therefore, a country lacing shocks largely from abroad through the exchange
rate will adopt a monetary rule that exacerbates the exchange rate changes
in order to stabilise real income.— 24—
(b)No domestic shocks ard no currency substitution
If there are no domestic shocks andifthe demand for domestic currency
is inelastic with respect to exchange rate changes (i.e. if a
2a2== 0)
u' urn
then the optimal money supply is independent of the exchange rate (a =0)-Thus,
except in the improbable event that the various components of (4.27') cancel
exactly, a policy of free floating is optimal if and mly if (1) the demand for
money is interest inelastic and (2) there are no domestic disturbances. Even
if the demand for money does not depend on the expected change of the exchange rate
(i.e. if 1= 0) exchange rate changes signal in part domestic shocks to which the money
supply should respond. This result is analogous to Poole's (1970) finding that in
the closed economy IS—LM model the optimal money supply is invariant to the interest
rate if and only if (1) the demand for money is interest inelastic and (2) the
economy is not subject to a variable demand for money
(b)No real or purchasing power parity shocks
When the only source of uncertainty is in the demand for either currency
(i.e. when 0y2 =a2=a2=0)then policy makes the supply of money perfectly
elastic. The exchange rate is pegged. This result is analogous to Poole's
finding that for a closed economy a policy of fixing the interest rate is optimal
when the only source of disturbances is in the demand for money. Thte that if
pegging the exchange rate is the optimal policy for one country, it is so for both.
Unless the two countries peg at the same level, however, the model become
inconsistent.
(d) Infinitely elastic currency substitution
If individuals view domestic and foreign currency as perfect substitutes then
*
= 3=o anda policy of pegging minimizes income variability even if the economy
is subject to real disturbances. If the authorities fail to peg the exchange rate,
exchange rate changes will subject both economies to wide swings in thedemandfor
money. These will create large price changes which will in turn destabilize—
income.lkgain, consistency requires that monetaryauthoritiespeg to the sante
exchange rate.
5.OptimalExchangeRate Management when Minixnising the Price Forecast Error
is the Objective
So far we have assumed that the policy makers objectives are to minimise
output variation around the cx ante expected natural rates (7.= = 0).
Onemightassume, instead, that policy makers are concernedwith the deviation
*




are unobserved contemporaneously. Such an objective is equivalent to mini














is plausible if one believes that price forecast errors themselves, rather than
output fluctuations, are a primary sorce of inefficiency. Ifsucha
specification is adopted, optimal policy rules arederivedfor the home country
by choosing a such that E(y —ulfl)
=0,given a* and forthe foreign country
by choosing a* such that E(y —uI) =0,given a. This yields
2 2 22
(5.5) a =S—(a +aa )/f(l +a)a]e y u u u
** 2 *22 **2
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Supply uncertainty now contributes toward the optimality of a policy of ex-
change rate stabilisation (leaning against the wind in the exchange market)
rather than the opposite.The reason is that an unanticipated increase in— 26—
output,ceteris paribus, will increase money demand, lower the price level and
cause the currency to appreciate. To eliminate the unanticioated nrice decline
moneyexpansion is now appropriate, dampening the exchange rate change.
Thevariability of foreignshocks, regardless of whether they are monetary
orreal in origin, has no effect on optimal domestic monetary policy.The
domestic effects of foreign shocks of either type are minimized by optimal foreign
monetary policy. Each monetary authority, in other words, acts to offset the
effects of local shocks on both itself and the other country.
Regardless of the variability of money demand or output supply shocks in either
economy, if the purchasing power relationship is non—stochastic a policy of pegging
the exchange rate is optimal. In this case if the exchange rate is fixed then so
are prices.
6. The Cooperative Pareto—Optimal Solution
So far we have assumed that each monetary authority acts independently
to attain a domestic policy objective, taking the monetary policy of the
other country as given.In this section we compare such policies with those
that would arise if the two monetary authorities were to cooperate in setting
monetary policy to attain a mutual objective. To derive the set of Pareto—
optimal policies we assume that policy makers jointly set monetary policy in





Assection 4 demonstrated, however, current values of and do not
affect values of yaM y for r> t.Choosing m to minimise
(6.1) is equivalent to choosing and mt to minimise— 27—
2- **2.
(5.2) wE(y I)+wE(y Ic) tt ttr 2- ** * 2-
w[(yE'1"I +wE(y—E(yI
+ wrE(ytIc2).]2+
Fromfootnote 11 it follows that the first twoterms of the
*
right—handside of expression (6.2) are independent of m and n. Ninunising
* . .
(6.2)with respect to and m ,then,is equivalent to nanimising
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First order conditions for a minimum are
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dy dydy dy —, — , , and—v are constants.These first—order conditions
dint dint dint dm
*
thereforeobtain when m and m satisfy:
(6.6) E(y..c2)E(yiJ1) =0
Since (6.4) and (6.5) are linear functions of nit and m ,thevalues of nit
and m which satisfy (6 .6)
:on5t.te
a unique solution. These are exactly
the same values of m and which satisfy the Nash equilibrium. In our
model, then, the Nash solution is also the unique Pareto—optimal solution.
This result is not surprising since, in our model, each country has one in-
dependent instrument, its money supply, and one independent target, the level
of its income. In such a context there are no gains from policy coordination.— 28—
Toshow that the equivalence of the Nash and Pareto—optimal solutions
does not generalise to systems in which there are more targets than instruments
consider a system in which one or both countries also have exchange rate sta—
bilisation as another goal, i.e. in period t the home country seeks to minimise.
(.7)E[E(y +03 e)[J w >0
while the foreign country minimises
*2*2 *
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* First—orderconditions for Nash equilibrium values of m and m are
given by
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Withweights of w and w placed on the home and foreign countries' objective
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* These are notequivalent to (6.9) and(6.10)except when w to0.
The Nash solution is not, in general, Pareto optimal.—29—
7. Conclusion
This study of optimal monetary policy or exchange ratemanagement in
interdependent economies has abstracted from many real—world complicationsto
obtain a transparent structure. Nevertheless, a number of results are likely
to be robust under further generalisations of the model:
1) .Neithera fixed nor a freely—floating exchange rate is likely to be
optimal.Optimal monetary policy in general requires a finite response of
the money supply to the exchange rate.
2). Output stabilising monetary policy may well require "leaning with
the wind" in the foreign exchange maUcets, expanding themoney supply when the
homecurrency depreciates, thus increasing the volatility of the exchange rate.
3).Monetaryauthorities can stabilise real variables when private and
public opportunity sets differ.In our model the monetary authoritiesare
ableand willing to establish (one period ahead) contingent forwardcontracts
making the money supply in period t a known function of the contemporaneously—
observed exchange rate.The private sector is assumed not to make exchange—rate
contingent forward contracts.This asynnetry creates an opportunity for
output stabilising (or destabilising) current exchange rate—contingent monetary
policy,
4) .Thereare likely to be gains from policy coordination.Footnotes
*Buiterwould like to acknowledge financial support from the N.S.F.
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Ninety—Second Annual
Meeting of the 1aTLerican Economic Association, Atlanta, Georgia, December
1979 and at the First Annual Conference of the Society for Economic Dynamics
and Control in Cambridge, England, June 1979 .StanleyBlack, Paul Krugrruan,
Marcus Miller and Douglas Purvis made useful comments.
1/ In this respect our model resembles that of Boye (1978) and Roper and
Turnovsky (1980).They,however, consider a single open economy
characterized by Keynesian unemployment. In a closed economy setting the
current response issue has been stiñied by C. Woglom (1979) and
McCallum and Whitaker (1979)
2/ In a very different model Canzoneri (1979) obtains a similar result.
3/ A time—consistent policy or plan is a sequence of rules, one for each period,
which specifies policy actions contingent on the state of the world in that
period.Each rule has the property of being optimal given the subsequent
elements in the sequence.When the current state depends on anticipations
of future states, such"optimat time—consistent policies may fail to take
account of the impact of future policy measures on the current state through
the changes in current behaviour induced by anticipation of these future
policy measures. In such models, the optimal plan in subsequent periods
may therefore not be the continuation of the first—period optimal plan over the
remainder of the planning period, i.e. the optimal plan will not be time—
consistent. See Kydland and Prescott (1977), Fischer (1980), Buiter (1980
a, b).
4/ If i >tfor some i, that is if the current state is a function of current
or past anticipations of a future state then the tine inconsistency problems
referred to in the previous footnote may arise. In the model developed insections 3 through 6, the time—consistent policy is also the optimal
policy even though expectations of the future exchange rate influence
the current exchange rate.
5/ In the modern theory of optimal policy design in stochastic models,
achievement of convergence has been replaced by the more general objective
ofminimizing deviations of target variables fran their desired values
over some finite or infinite time horizon.Nevertheless, the distinctions
wehave made about different forms of decentralization extend to the
Mundellian problem.
6/ Trivial exceptions arise when =
a2
=0or when a2 l ="12 In
thiscase the model is in neutral equilibrium irrespective of policy.
7/ contracts which do not allow wages to respond to contemporaneous data might
arise because such data arenotavailable symmetrically to workers and
employers, leading to problems of moral hazard.See Eaton and Quandt (1979)
for a discussion.
8/Barro (1978) also assumes that thedemandformoney responds to expected
exchange rate changes in his model of monetary policy in a small open economy.
9/ We assume away all problems of non—uniqueness through extraneous information.
The information sets of all agents are therefore limited to variables which
appear in the structural model, given expectations, that is to market
fundamentalsin the sense of FlOod and Garber (1979) .Seealso Taylor
(1977).
10/Kydland (1976) provides a discussion of optimal stabilisation policies




In our model y and e are jointly normally distributed.
The conditional variance of y is independent of e (see e.g. 1-Iogg
and Craig (1965), pp. 63—65 and pp. 102—104.and Buiter (197gb)). It
is therefore also independent of any known linear function of e
*.... 12.
suchas tn or mt.Mininusing ELYt let) is therefore equivalent to
minimising[1Jet]J.
This is achieved by choosing a
suchthat E(yle)o.
12/See Harrisand Purvis (1979) f ora single economy ncdel of exchange
ratedetermination including permanent as well as transitary disturbances.REFERENCES
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